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THE PHILOSOPHICAL TURN: EXAMINING THE FOUNDATIONAL 
PRESUPPOSITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
AND THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE IMAGE OF 
THE STATE
Mainstream International Relations theory (neorealism, neoliberalism 
and positivist constructivism) largely adheres to a model of the 
state as a rational unitary-actor. This model is deemed necessary 
because the goal of the mainstream theories is to isolate the systemic 
causes of international state behavior. This goal is predicated upon 
certain underlying philosophical presuppositions, namely: 1) the 
privileging of material over ideational causes, and 2) the analytical 
distinction between state and international levels of analysis. The 
first presupposition leads to a focus on material forces (e.g. weapons 
and economic resources), largely excluding the impact of ideas. The 
second presupposition isolates systemic forces, bracketing-out the 
internal domestic politics of states types of government for example. 
This focus on material and systemic forces is facilitated by the rational 
unitary-actor image of the state. However, if the goal is to understand 
alternative causal factors (e.g. individual agency, domestic politics, 
multi-level shared idea for example) then an alternative model of 
the state becomes necessary. The model proposed here is one based 
upon Weber’s methodological individualism and views the state as 
a “pluralistic” (rather than unitary) and “fallible” (rather than 
rational) international actor.  
Keywords: International Relations, States, Neorealism, Material Forces, 
Rational-Actor 
Introduction
With the advent of Waltz’s neorealism, mainstream International Relations 
(IR) theory shifted away from several classical realist principles, ultimately 
creating an altered set of foundational presuppositions specific to its own 
logic. The foremost presupposition asserts that the fundamental causes of 
international relations derive from structured material conditions at the 
systemic level. This assertion has various theoretical consequences including 
the eclipse of ideational explanations by material ones, a sharper analytical 
distinction between domestic politics and international politics, and adoption 
of the state as a rational unitary-actor model. While all these positions prove 
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advantageous if one’s goal is the analytical isolation of systemic causation; 
for various other purposes, there are significant drawbacks. The seriousness 
of these drawbacks depends on the validity of the base assumption that the 
fundamental causes of international relations are systemic. While the validity 
of the neorealist framework seemed strongest during the Cold War, since the 
end of that bipolar condition many aspects of the theory have been challenged. 
This has occurred in part due to the perception that mainstream IR theories 
have been unable to explain adequately the causes of the end of the Cold War 
and a variety of subsequent international events.
  One of the reasons for neorealism’s post-Cold War crisis 
involves its parsimony. In opting for simplicity, the theory ignores many 
pertinent causal factors; including a variety of ideas and practices at the 
individual and domestic levels.1 If indeed these alternative factors are necessary 
to explain adequately international behavior, then the construction of an 
alternative to the rational unitary-actor state model is one way to include them. 
Such an alternative could include the plurality of individual and group actors 
that constitute the state, as well as the shared ideas institutions, norms, beliefs, 
desires, etc., which motivate state policy and action. As such, the purpose of 
the current work is to investigate the need for a more complex model of the 
state than that provided by the rational unitary-actor image.    
Waltz, who, in the process of constructing the most influential IR theory 
to date, inevitably sowed the seeds for various challenges. Buzan, Jones, and 
Little argue that Waltz, attempting to create an epistemologically positivist 
realist theory, stirred up interest in the “philosophical foundations” of IR 
theory.2 They write, “The epistemological straight jacket of empiricism has 
been loosened, and the field is now informed as well by more philosophically 
open tendencies.”3 This epistemological “loosening” arguably inspired 
four theoretical turns in late 20th Century IR theory. These include a micro-
economic, a sociological, and a linguistic turn, as well as the philosophical 
turn itself.
The Micro-Economic Turn
To make realism more materially oriented and “scientific,” Waltz adapted 
rational-choice theory from microeconomics as one of the key elements of his 
systemic theory.4 Within this micro-economic turn, states are conceptualized as 
the IR equivalent of rational-actor individuals. Essentially, to justify this move 
Waltz posited states rather than embodied individuals as the unitary-actors 
comprising the international system.5 Consequently, states are personified and 
seen to pursue their own interests, understood as distinct from the interests of 
constituent actors. 
Neorealism sees three essential elements as constituting the international 
system. First, the system is anarchic. In other words, there is no overarching 
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government or power which can enforce international laws.6 Consequently, the 
international order is a self-help system with states perpetually in fear of military 
attack by other states. Secondly, a rational unitary-actor model in which states 
are considered “like-units.” This effectively eliminates specific characteristics 
of states (i.e. domestic politics) from the analysis. Thirdly, the distribution 
of material capabilities which is essentially the distribution of economic and 
military power across the international system.7 This distribution is understood 
as a “systemic” cause, independent from any bottom-up unit level process. It 
is this systemic level distribution of power which is understood as the primary 
cause of international behavior.
Essentially, neorealism brackets-out individual, ideational, and 
domestic level aspects of international behavior in order to focus exclusively 
on systemic level causation. However, this parsimony comes at the cost of 
abandoning explanations that are more comprehensive.8 Regardless, the micro-
economic turn has proven fruitful for IR research, giving rise to a variety of 
structure-oriented security studies approaches, as well as a more economic-
oriented neoliberal institutionalism.9 Gerrard Ruggie argues that neorealism 
and neoliberalism share a similar rational-choice approach referred to as neo-
utilitarianism.10 The term “neo-utilitarian” will be used here when referring to 
this shared rational-choice perspective. 
The Sociological Turn
Headley Bull developed many of the ideas constituting the English school.11 
Bull argued that interstate relations develop ideational norms among states; 
resulting in a shift from a Hobbesian international system, where states coexist 
under conditions of perpetual fear and mistrust; to a Grotian-type international 
society, where international norms mitigate the violence characteristic of 
anarchic systems.12 This development, from international “system” to “society,” 
sees international relations becoming less hostile and more cooperative. The 
emphasis on international norms was in many ways a precursor to a broader 
sociological turn within the discipline developed under constructivism.  
To develop constructivism, Alexander Wendt explored deep 
philosophical questions surrounding the ontological and epistemological 
foundations of IR.13 Wendt sought to challenge the materialist orientation of 
neorealism through developing a social constructivist approach to IR, one 
which recognized the importance of bringing ideas back-in to the discipline.. 
However, like the neo-utilitarian theories, Wendt confined his analysis to 
factors at the systemic level. Consequently, his constructivism upholds an 
image of the state as a personified unitary-actor. Wendt’s constructivism was in 
the leading vanguard of a far-reaching sociological-turn in IR, where a variety 
of sociological theories social constructivism, historical sociology, and critical 
theory to name a few were adapted to explore international relations issues. 
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The Linguistic Turn
While Wendt claimed constructivism was part of a “positivist project,” this is 
not the only epistemology associated with either constructivism or a variety 
of other ideationally oriented perspectives.14 Some IR scholars utilize post-
positivist, post-structuralist, and post-modernist theories borrowed from across 
the social sciences to develop a linguistic turn for the discipline. Linguistic 
approaches, largely flowing from Wittgenstein through Foucault, have been 
adapted to explore how threats to state security are discursively constructed to 
legitimize various degrees of political authority and control.15 
Following this turn, the concept of “securitization” was developed to 
explain how a security discourse is frequently part of a political strategy often 
for domestic rather than international purposes.16 One important implication 
of this is that there may be no intrinsic connection between the discourse 
surrounding state security and actual external material threats.17 Within 
the linguistic turn, the state is seen as a product of discourse rather than an 
ontologically existent entity, and consequently, related perspectives generally 
do not view the state as a rational unitary-actor. However, viewing the state as 
a purely discursive construct is significantly removed from the material reality 
of the state; including embodied individuals and military hardware. This can 
lead to a dangerous underestimation of actual security threats with potentially 
catastrophic consequences. 
The Philosophical Turn
In what some see as an extension of Wendt’s constructivist critique of 
neorealism,18 scientific realists have further problematized the foundations 
of the discipline through a philosophical turn. Utilizing ideas from the 
philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, scientific realism confronts 
many of the presuppositions of IR theory. According to Joseph and Wight, 
scientific realism works “at the level of philosophical critique, challenging 
the philosophical assumptions of much contemporary IR theory and in so 
doing it also introduces important epistemological and ontological insights 
in its own right.”19 Scientific realists claim to provide a scientific alternative 
to positivism, addressing many of the post-positivist critiques of positivism 
without regressing into a relativistic, anti-science position.20 While it is 
debatable whether the perspective successfully develops a pragmatic non-
positivist position; nevertheless, adherents have inspired a reengagement with 
the philosophical foundations of mainstream IR. Consequently, in light of both 
the limitations of neo-utilitarianism to contend with various post-Cold War 
events and the shortcomings of linguistic theories concerning material security 
threats, this is arguably a necessary step towards any development of a more 
comprehensive IR theory. Concerning the state, scientific realists hold varied 
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positions. In his later work, Wendt shifts towards scientific realism, using the 
perspective to argue that the state is literally a personified “superorganism” with 
its own interests and goals.21 However, other proponents of scientific realism 
maintain that the state is comprised of a complex array of social relations. What 
scientific realists all tend to have in common, however, is the belief that states 
are comprised of emergent properties which cannot be adequately understood 
if analysis is restricted to the individual level substrate.22 
While the discipline has seen other influential perspectives, arguably 
these four “turns” represent the most influential theoretical developments since 
the end of WWII. Importantly, one thing the various turns all have in common 
is an engagement with the “third debate” in IR theory involving the positivist/
post-positivist divide. Many scholars have taken an interest in scientific realism 
because it seems to offer resolutions to this debate.23 Buzan, for example, claims 
that scientific realism “mitigates the binds of relativism and reflexivity that 
have restricted so much self-proclaimed postmodernist and poststructuralist 
work.”24 However, while offering some legitimate solutions scientific realism 
brings significant problems of its own, especially concerning the idea of 
emergent social properties which encourages the analytical reification of 
social structures. What follows is an examination of many of the issues which 
motivate scientific realism without arriving at the same conclusions. Basically, 
the goal of this investigation is to assess whether the rational unitary-actor 
model of the state unnecessarily restricts analysis to systemic level causes; 
perhaps obscuring the impact of alternative factors, particularly individuals, 
ideas, and domestic politics. If this is the case, then perhaps a more complex 
model of the state is necessary; one which takes account of alternative non-
systemic forces. 
The methodological approach used here involves an intertextual 
examination of the ideas behind the various theoretical turns. The micro-
economic turn is predominantly explicated through the work of Waltz, while the 
other turns are variously explored through the work of Wendt and the scientific 
realists. Weber is also brought in to investigate the potential for his form of 
methodological individualism to provide a foundation for an alternative state 
model. This intertextual approach utilizes both descriptive and explanatory 
methods to evaluate several prominent philosophical presuppositions in 
mainstream IR theory. This framework divides this study into three parts: 
1) investigates the mainstream bias towards materialist over ideational 
explanatory factors; 2) questions the analytical value provided by the levels of 
analysis distinction, and 3) explores the advantages and drawbacks of the state 
as a rational unitary-actor assumption. 
It is hoped that this investigation might better enable the discipline 
to incorporate: a) a stronger role for ideational forces in IR; b) the inclusion 
of multi-level factors which influence international behavior; and c) a role 
for individual agency in an alternative model of the state. Ultimately, the 
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goal is to weigh the rationale for a more complex theory of the state; one 
which might provide an analytical counterweight balancing what are arguably 
broad disciplinary biases towards overly parsimonious materialist and 
systemic explanations. Regardless of the obstacles, IR theory will continue 
to find innovative and insightful ways to address foundational concerns as 
investigations into the international behavior of states continue to develop.
The Material, the Ideational, and the Individual 
Waltz’s neorealism aimed to shift the discipline away from the classical realist 
paradigm. Classical realism especially as delineated by Morgenthau, Carr, and 
Niebuhr saw a large role for “human nature” in the causes of international 
aggression.25 Inspired by Hobbes, classical realists viewed the human character 
as innately violently, egoistic, and capricious, and this darker irrational side 
of humanity was understood to manifest itself in international relations. 
Consequently, an egoistic drive for power was understood to perpetuate 
the threat of violence and war. Waltz wanted to move IR theory away from 
speculation about human nature, and towards a systemic theory more conducive 
to empirical positivism. To accomplish this, IR needed objective observable 
causal factors. Waltz found these factors in the structure of the international 
system, comprised of the distribution of material capabilities (weapons and 
economic resources) among unitary-actor states. As a consequence, neorealism 
realism is in essence a materialist theory.
But what of the role of ideas in influencing state actions? For 
contemporary realists, material systemic constraints are seen as the primary 
causal factors behind international behavior. Neoclassical realists, for 
example, view ideas and institutions as important; however, they differ from 
the classical realists in giving systemic factors a fundamental causal role. As 
Rathbun puts it, “Neoclassical realism begins with the premise that ideal state 
behavior is that which conforms to the unitary actor and objectivity premises 
of neorealism but shows that when these conditions are not met empirically, 
domestic politics and ideas are the culprits.”26 In other words, domestic politics 
and ideas are causally contingent, diverting states from what would otherwise 
be optimal rational action oriented towards systemic constraints.27 For offensive 
realists, the influence of ideas on international relations is paltry compared 
to the impact of objective systemic constraints reduced to materially-oriented 
conflict and power politics.28 In addition, for defensive realists, such as Waltz, 
while ideational factors are acknowledged, their analysis is considered a form 
of reductionism, by which Waltz means ideas are epiphenomenal, supervening 
on material systemic forces.29
Alternatively, outside of contemporary realism there is an alternative 
debate concerning the impact of ideas on state behavior. Some important 
contributions in this regards were made by Karl Deutsch and his concept of 
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pluralistic security communities.30 Essentially, Deutsch believed that even 
within an anarchic system states could develop trust towards one another 
leading to what he referred to as “peaceful change.”31 Later on, the English 
school developed an ideationally based Grotian international society (and a 
more vaguely defined Kantian world society) which remains pertinent today.32 
However, the most influential Cold War era challenge to neorealism came 
from neoliberal institutionalism, which although remaining significantly 
materialist in orientation contains the concept of international regimes which 
allow for some impact of ideas on international behavior.33 Then came Wendt’s 
constructivism, which made an influential effort to bring sociological concepts 
concerning the importance of “ideas” into the IR mainstream. According to 
Wendt, the impact of ideas at the systemic level fundamentally mitigates 
material systemic forces; and consequently, as the title of his seminal paper 
implies, “Anarchy is What States Make it.”34 However, although dealing with 
ideas, Wendt maintains the unitary-actor model and the systemic focus of 
neo-utilitarianism. By contrast, also exploring ideas, a variety of discursive-
oriented post-positivist approaches developed out of the linguistic turn.35 
Finally, in terms of the impact of ideas within the philosophical turn, scientific 
realists suggest that both the state and international system are imbued with 
broad social structures in part comprised of emergent ideational institutions.36
 With the reintroduction of the ideational back into IR theory, especially 
through the various discursive theories, questions concerning the relationship 
between the material and the ideational came to the fore. The debate over the 
veracity of mainstream material-oriented theories has proponents arguing 
that any shortcomings are necessary and insignificant compared to what the 
paradigm can explain; versus critics who argue that significant alterations in 
IR theory (perhaps even to the extent of a paradigm shift) need to take place. 
In terms of neorealism, these shortcomings involve the theory being overly 
materially-oriented, positivistic, and deterministic; ultimately proposing 
frequently incorrect predictions and even at times dangerous solutions to 
certain international problems37—universal nuclear proliferation as a catalyst 
towards world peace for example38 For discursive theories, shortcomings 
surround their being too ideational, post-positivistic, and relativistic; leading 
to “academic” theories, which run the risk of becoming increasingly detached 
from “real world” security issues. 
Gerard Ruggie has argued that “neo-utilitarian” theories and 
discursive post-positive perspectives are not additive and that analysts must 
accept this fundamental incommensurability.39 However, one could argue 
that incommensurability, rather than an absolute condition is more a matter 
of degree; and that we should not rule out the possibility that the neorealist 
focus on material structure is in some sense comparable and contrastable to 
discursive ideational factors, thereby allowing a more comprehensive, albeit 
tentative, picture of the international order. However, how to approach any 
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integration between material and ideational perspectives? Scientific realists 
try to develop a philosophical means through which additive analysis can be 
accomplished, although most adherents accept this approach has significant 
difficulties and drawbacks. Scientific realists combine what they see as the 
necessity for ontological realism with epistemological relativism, and through 
this move claim to provide a middle ground where positivism and post-
positivism can come together.40 However, this leaves the perspective open to 
the critique that if epistemology is relative then there is no logical way to 
develop knowledge which more or less accurately reflects ontological reality. 
Hence, this position remains mired in a post-positivist relativism.
What scientific realism is lacking is a means through which to ground 
discourse by incorporating some form of materialism. Arguably, one way 
to attempt this is through the neorealist distribution of material capabilities. 
However, this is not the only form of materialism which affects international 
relations. Another important and often overlooked factor involves the material 
impact of human embodiment. In other words, nothing in international relations 
is accomplished without an actual individual carrying out some action (even 
if only pushing a button). When individuals organize into collectivities we 
get the formation of complex entities, such as the state, which consist of an 
irreducible material-side through human embodiment and physical resources. 
Bull hints at this alternative when he writes, “World order is more fundamental 
than international order because the ultimate units of the great society of 
mankind are not states (or nations, tribes, empires, classes or parties) but 
individual human beings…”.41 This quote exposes the lack, in both mainstream 
neo-utilitarian and ideational alternatives, of a theory of the state which can 
account for the impact of individual agency, in terms of specific individuals 
and collectivities, on international behavior.
 Against this idea of an individualist-oriented IR, Wendt writes, “…
many students of group intentionality have concluded that however desirable 
in theory, reducing group intentions to an individual is often impossible in 
practice.”42 However, contradicting Wendt’s claim, within sociology there are 
social constructivist theories symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology 
for example which argue for a methodological individualist, as opposed 
to structuralist, approach. For the most part, however, these individualist 
alternatives have had little impact on mainstream IR. However, one finds in the 
work of Max Weber a theory in which individual intentions can be developed 
to comprehend group intentionality. With his interpretive social action theory, 
Weber provides a kind of collectivist individualism distinguishable from the 
atomistic individualism of microeconomics. In Weber’s collective individualism 
it is the shared ideas and coordinated practices of individuals which give 
rise to the collectivities which shape social reality.43 The implications of this 
position for IR are that rather than unitary-actor states responding primarily 
to structural forces, both the state and its propensity towards either aggression 
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or cooperation develop from networks of interactions among actual embodied 
individuals. Such a move would require a more complex individualist-oriented 
model of the state 
A Weberian individualist perspective allows the synthesis of 
material reality with discursive constructs because people are comprised of 
both material bodies and ideational minds. While embodied individuals 
interact with an objective physical world, an understanding of the ideational 
motivations behind these interactions is necessary to fully understand collective 
social behavior. Consequently, when neorealists view the international system 
from a predominantly materialist point of view; while they can compare 
the relative distribution of material capabilities across the system, this does 
nothing to explain the predisposition of various states towards the use of these 
capabilities. On the other hand, if the system is understood predominantly 
from an ideational perspective, excluding the materiality of both individuals 
and security threats, we disconnect analysis from the physical world—or what 
Marx understood as “embodied human practice.”44 
It is embodied human practice which informs Wendt’s “group 
intentionality,” leading to the development of complex collective entities 
such as the state. Rather than unitary-actors, Weber’s methodology allows 
for states comprised of specific individuals as well as multi-level collective 
actors; including, for example, economic classes, religious denominations, and 
political parties. Ultimately, some form of Weberian individualism can help the 
discipline avoid the pitfalls of both an overly materialistic positivism and an 
excessively ideational constructivism or post-positivism. Although discursive 
constructs have an influence on how power is manifested in myriad forms, 
once formed the material extensions of power have the real ability to dominate 
and destroy the very minds and bodies from which thoughts and actions 
emanate. The pen and the sword both exist as methods of change and control in 
international relations, one not being comprehensible in any pragmatic sense 
without the other.
Levels of Analysis and the Unitary-Actor State
Mainstream IR theory distinguishes three potential levels of analysis: the 
individual level, the domestic or states level, and the international or systemic 
level— Waltz alternatively referred to these as the “first, second, and third 
images.”45 Positivist-oriented IR theories generally consider structured 
systemic forces to be the fundamental causes of international behavior.46 More 
specifically, Waltz’s neorealism draws a distinction between structure and 
process, with structure generally understood as the distribution of material 
capabilities across the system, and process as a unit level phenomenon 
through which specific state policies are determined.47 However, Waltz was 
not completely clear about the nature of process, at times suggesting its 
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dependence on systemic forces rather than having any independent causal 
impact. Since Waltz, neorealists have generally considered unit level process 
the area of inquiry specific to foreign policy studies, with the examination of 
systemic causation deemed the proper focus for international politics.48 In part, 
the assumption of the state as rational unitary-actor enables systemic forces 
to be analytically isolated from the “noise” of unit level process. Mirroring 
micro-economic theory, where individuals make rational decisions concerning 
material interests, neo-utilitarians search for objective material interests for 
unitary-actor states. These interests are conceptualized as the states struggle 
for security and the material capabilities through which states project power 
across the international system.  
Although largely understood as offering a clear alternative to the 
predominantly materialist orientation of the neo-utilitarian perspectives, 
Wendt’s constructivism has several things in common with the mainstream 
framework. For one, Wendt subscribes to a “states systemic project,” a 
commitment not shared by all constructivist-oriented theorists.49 This project 
accepts the state as unitary-actor image and a fundamental causal role for top-
down systemic forces. This framework, as well as Wendt’s commitment to 
positivism, leads him to accept the importance of the distinction between levels 
of analysis. As Wendt asserts, 
Theories of international politics are distinguished from those that 
have as their object explaining the behavior of individual states, 
or ‘theories of foreign policy.’ It is important that IR do both kinds 
of theorizing, but their dependent variables, aggregate behavior 
versus unit behavior, are on different levels of analysis and so their 
explanations are not comparable.50
But why are different levels of analysis not comparable? In answer, Wendt argues 
that attempts to compare levels must undergo a shift from “systemic theory” to 
a “theory of the state.”51 This is something systemic-oriented positivists want to 
avoid, in part because parsimonious systemic theories appear more “scientific” 
than messy “reductionist” explanations. This supposed messiness is largely 
due to unit level explanations being contingent on a plethora of historical and 
subjective variables making them difficult to quantify; and hence, not readily 
conducive to empirical methodologies. Wendt hopes to avoid these difficulties 
by restricting the role of ideas to those held by unitary-actor states exclusively 
at the systemic level. It is in this sense that both Waltz and Wendt adhere to a 
common framework where the separation of levels of analysis enables a focus 
on systemic forces. Where they differ, however, is in their understanding of 
the nature of systemic causation as either fundamentally material or ideational.
Scientific realists argue that the division between domestic and 
systemic levels of analysis is a consequence of a commitment to a positivist 
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project. Many IR scholars, from a broad range of perspectives largely outside 
of the constraints of positivism, which includg scientific realism, critical theory, 
historical sociology, post-positivism/structuralism/modernism, and feminist 
theory argue that positivism is not a privileged methodology necessary for the 
study of international politics. For many of these non-positivist perspectives, 
the assumption that micro and macro-levels are not comparable, and thae they 
can be studied in isolation from one another, is problematic.52 Scientific realists, 
for example, argue that once the positivist project is rejecte, strict adherence 
to the levels of analysis divisions appears as not only provisional but indeed 
oftentimes unnecessary.53 Arguing that the levels of analysis distinction hae no 
fundamental theoretical justification, Koivisto writes,
Recent meta-theoretical debates have been important not least 
in highlighting that the carving up of world politics into select 
spatial levels is enabled by a particular set of philosophical, often 
methodological commitments and have thus unsettled the view 
that the resultant ‘levels-of-analysis’ framework provides a social 
ontology of world politics. Scholars have also suggested social 
scientific alternatives to framing objects of analysis in IR.54
As an alternative, Koivisto posits “multi-scaler” forces, which emerge from 
unobservable, yet real, structural forces spanning the levels of analysis.55 
For Koivisto, these forces involve collective actors engaging with various 
institutions and practices, leading to the “emergence” of complex social 
relations not reduceable to explanations at the individual level.56 Scientific 
realists tend to view socially-structured entities as having, according to Rivas, 
“real emergent existence, properties and causal powers (that) cannot be reduced 
to their individual components.”57
The scientific realist challenge to the levels of analysis distinction 
is unavoidably a challenge to the image of the state as a personified unitary-
actor. However, there is no broad consensus within scientific realism as to what 
constitutes the state, other than the idea that it is comprised of collective entities 
with emergent properties. Interestingl, however, Wendt, utilizing scientific 
realist ideas on emergence, argues that the state is actually a personified 
“superorganism.”58 Concerning this perspective, Koivisto writes, “Perhaps 
the most controversial aspect of Wendt’s theory of state personhood is that 
Wendt left the state unit/international system distinction untouched.”59 Rather 
than viewing the personified state image as a necessary component of the unit/
system distinction, Koivisto seems to suggest the opposite, that a personified 
state image should lead one to deconstruct the unit/system distinction. If states 
are personified superorganisms, with their own interests and agency, then the 
unit level process takes on new significance, potentially muting the impact of 
systemic forces.
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Alternatively, from a Weberian perspective, rather than a personified 
unitary-actor with emergent properties, state agence may be in principle 
understood through the collective actions of its constitutive individuals. 
Consequently, analytical focus on the shared ideas and coordinated practices 
of these individuals has the potential tp bridge the divide between domestic 
politics and international relations. This is possible because the same 
individuals are simultaneously multi-scaler actor, comprising both domestic 
systems within the state ans states as actors within the international system. 
This is not to deny the important role of systemic level analysis utilizing the 
unitary-actor image. Such analysis is indispensable for understanding patterns 
of international behavior which persist over long periods, especialle balance of 
power politics among the various types of great power polarities. However, if 
the analytical goal is to explore the possibilities of systemic transformatio, then 
the dynamic unit level process of foreign policy formation, as it derives from 
the collective multi-scaler thoughts and actions of constituent individuals, 
needs an IR theoretical accounting. 
In search of a more scientific theory for IR, positivist approaches 
whether neo-utilitarian or constructivist  have made exogenous the unit 
level proces, which guides the formation of foreign policy. While this move 
facilitates the theoretical isolation of structural forces, which undoubtedly 
provide the discipline with indispensable insights, it also comes with significant 
drawbacks. Scientific realists explain how the levels of analysis separation is 
not an epistemological necessity, and how it restricts the ability of IR theory 
to contend with the impact of unit level forces on state behavior. However, 
scientific realism tends to advance ideas concerning emergent structural forces 
with downward causational agency autonomous from the individual level 
substrate. From a Weberian perspective, this type of autonomous agency is a 
form of reification. 
As an alternative to positivism, Weber advocates verstehen. Verstehen 
involves an interpretivist approach, essentially exploring the meanings 
individuals express as the motivations behind their social actions. This 
methodology is widely considered an alternative to more materialist behaviorist 
methodologie, which focus on observable actions rather than the meanings 
behind the actions.60 Interpretive methodologies counter the tendencies towards 
reification brought about by “emergence,” helping to understand the shared 
ideational institutions behind structured social practices. Ultimately, both 
scientific realism and Weberian interpretivism offer non-positivist approache, 
which aim to avoid a post-positivistic relativism. To accomplish thi, however, 
the theory needs to be grounded in material reality. Scientific realism offers a 
materialist ontology disconnected from an epistemological relativism, which 
ultimately cannot escape the relativist trap of post-positivism. Alternatively, it 
is Weber’s interpretivist methodology, coupled with the material embodiment 
of the individual, which allows us to imagine “multi-scaler” institutions and 
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practices behind collective action. If a model of the state can be constructed 
using this type of individualist methodology, then the distinction between the 
domestic and international levels of analysis can be relaxed, and in some cases 
discarded completely.
A Pluralistic Fallible nation: An alternative theory of the state
What exactly is the ontological status of the state within mainstream IR? Is the 
rational unitary-actor model a theoretical abstraction, useful for the analytical 
isolation of systemic factors— but not intended as real? In that direction, 
Waltz “freely admits” that states, “are in fact not unitary purposive actors.”61 
Moreover, Robert Gilpin remarks, “Of coursetthe state does not really exist,” 
and further warns us against committing “the fallacy of reification.”62 As well, 
Richard Little claims that to talk of the state as an actor is, “simply a form of 
shorthand,” which refers to, “the human agents who represent the state.”63 
From a neorealist perspective, rather than looking at domestic variable, 
the point is to isolate the systemic force, that impact upon state behavior. Waltz 
argues that the assumption of states as unitary-actor/like-units is necessary to 
theoretically isolatey systemic factors. This isolation moves IR away from 
theories, which posit specific characteristics for various states.64 Waltz strives 
for a systemic theory, not because system forces are unequivocally causally 
primary  they may or may not be  but rathe, because they facilitate a materialist 
and parsimonious theory more conducive to empirical evaluation.
But there are serious problems with this whole attempt to isolate 
systemic causes and make IR more scientific. For one, it is not at all clear 
that systemic forces are more causally fundamental that alternative factors. As 
well, the subject matter of IR is not the same as that of the natural sciences, 
and consequently the ideas and intentions of the individuals who comprise 
states almost certainly matter. These problems could be alleviated if neorealists 
were to remember that the state as the unitary-actor model is, as Little puts 
it, “simply a form of shorthand,” rather than a reality.65 Unfortunatelr, such 
qualifications tend to be forgotten in practice, and predictions and policy 
prescriptions are developed from “reductionist” systemic theories  reductionist 
not in Waltz’s sense, but rather, in the sense that potentially vital causal factors 
are left out of consideration.
In his earlier writings, Wendt appears to accept the unitary-actor 
model as a theoretical abstraction necessary to maintain the states-centric 
paradigm. However, in his later wor, he presents a nuanced defense of genuine 
state personification. Wendt describes the four main properties whic, in his 
vie, make states actual unitary-actors: “(1) a unitary identity that persists over 
time; (2) beliefs about their environment; (3) transitive desires that motivate 
them to move; and (4) the ability to make choices on a rational basis, usually 
defined as expected-utility maximisation.”66 Wendt even goes as far as to argue 
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that the state might actually be a manifestation of a collective consciousness, 
inhabiting a kind of emergent superorganism. To try to justify these assertion, 
Wende borrows many of the arguments surrounding emergence and downward 
causation developed by IR oriented scientific realists.
Although scientific realism does not go as far as Wendt in postulating 
the state as an actual superorganism,67 in asserting that collective entities 
with emergent properties are ontologically rea, it is understandable that such 
conclusions could be drawn from the logic of the position. However, rather 
than an actual personified entity, scientific realists tend to view the state as 
part of an emergent “institutional ensemble;”68 comprised of “institutionalized 
social relations and strategic actors”.69 These ensembles, however, are not 
restricted to the domestic realm; or as Koivisto states, “The emergentist 
approach to a level does not give the nation-state ontological primacy over 
the international; instead, the state and the international levels could be seen 
to arise from both similar and dissimilar social processes and conditions.”70 
Essentially, for scientific realists the state, along with the state’s system, 
emerges from broader structural condition, which encompass all social entitie, 
including the state; and all social system, including the international system.
The linguistic turn brought with it a discursive ontology, which inevitably 
extended to the disciplines “theory of the state.” IR proponents of the linguistic 
turn are in agreement with Gilpin as concerns the claim that the state does 
not really exist. However, whereas neorealists like Gilpin see the unitary-actor 
state as comprised of an individual level substrate,71 linguistic theories take 
issue with the entire concept of the individual, which for many proponents 
only exists as a discursive construct. This discursive ontology extends to the 
nature of the state, the reality of which can never be grasped outside of the way 
language determines the parameters of our capacity to think and talk about 
it. This perspective is valuable in that it captures the ephemeral nature of the 
state, in terms of how both social actors and analysts perceive it; however, it 
is also problematic in minimizing the impact of material forces, especially 
military forces with the capacity for non-linguistically-mediated destructive 
capabilities. 
In essence, the unitary-actor state model upheld by the neo-
utilitarian and constructivist mainstream is unable to account for the impact 
of non-systemic level ideas on international behavior. As well, the discursive 
alternatives deconstruct the whole concept of the state, and in the process 
relativize what are actual material security threats. If both these claims are 
valid, then IR would do well to heed John Hobson’s advice and reevaluate the 
disciplines entire understanding of exactly what kind of entity is this thing we 
call “the state.”72 For neo-utilitarians, a theory of the state “drops out” from 
the framework in favor of the billiard ball image of unitary-actor  states which 
behave as like-units. Wendt’s personified state and scientific realism’s emergent 
“institutional ensemble” are both problematic in that they reify not only the 
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state but social systems in general. And discursive theories do away with the 
state as an existent material entity altogether. In light of these conditions, if 
the theoretical goal is to construct an alternative to the unitary-actor model, 
what characteristics would this model need to entail to address some of the 
shortcomings of the alternatives? Two possibilities will be suggested here: 1) 
the state as a pluralistic entity, and 2) the state as a fallible nation.
Pluralistic Entity vs Unitary Actor
An alternative model could embrace some form of Weberian-inspired 
methodological individualism to develop a pluralistic (as opposed to unitary-
actor) model of the state. Ultimately, the actions of states are always peopled 
actions; states being incapable of having autonomous goals, fears, desires, or 
rational interests, as only embodied individuals have these traits. Of course 
admittedly, individuals form collectivities to pursue shared ideas through 
coordinated actions; but to the best of our knowledge such collectivities do 
not have interests and agency autonomous from their component individuals 
—except, as previously noted, as a kind of theoretical shorthand. 
Through the individual consisting of both ideational mind and 
material body, an individualist methodology enables the analytical comparison 
of the discursive and physical aspects which comprise the state and ultimately 
the international order. However, there are at least three alternative forms of 
individualism to consider. One is the atomistic individualism of microeconomics, 
which develops an abstract model of individuals as rational actors. This type 
of individualism was adapted by Waltz to form the neorealist assumption of 
states as rational unitary-actors conceptualized as behaving “like” individuals. 
The second form of individualism is that of specific individuals. Concerning 
the behavior of states, this type of individualism is found in foreign policy 
studies where specific political actors—  various state leaders, elite politicians, 
and diplomats, for example —basically devise and drive state policy. The 
third form is Weber’s more collectivist methodological individualism. While 
Weber acknowledges the usefulness of the atomistic and specific individuals 
approaches, he puts forth two additional methodological tools: the averages 
of groups, and the ideal-type.73 Unlike the unitary-actor model, these tools 
allow for the evaluation of a plurality of shared ideational institutions and their 
impact on the collective behavior of groups, which comprise the state. 
A pluralistic image of the state could be constructed with the goal 
of examining the individually mediated ideational institutions which, being 
multi-scaler, simultaneously span the domestic and international levels. Some 
examples of these types of institutions relevant for IR include cosmopolitan 
vs communitarian senses of identity, free-trade vs interventionist economic 
policies, and democratic vs authoritarian political ideologies. An alternative 
state model would also be pluralistic in the sense of being comprised of key 
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national components. These national components would be aggregates of 
individuals as opposed to reified collective units with autonomous agency 
and interests. Possible components include various political, economic, and 
socio-cultural groupings of elite actors with shared interests and identities. As 
well, various segments of the populace can be methodologically distinguished, 
perhaps conceptualized as some form of electoral constituents, market 
consumers, and epistemic cultural communities.
Fallible Nation vs Rational-Actor
Besides being viewed as a pluralistic entity, an alternative state model should 
include the fallible agency of the state (as opposed to assuming states as 
rational actors). One important contribution towards understanding state 
fallibility involves the scientific realist assertion that all epistemological 
constructs are necessarily fallible.74 Accordingly, there is no absolute way for 
actors to make infallible decisions or analysts to develop infallible knowledge. 
Within the neo-utilitarian paradigm, the rational state assumption is usually 
qualified, in that most sophisticated analysis sees rational state behavior as the 
ideal; as opposed to behavior being an inevitable state response to supposedly 
objective systemic constraints. Gideon Rose contends, “Purely systemic 
explanations of foreign policy presume a reasonably accurate apprehension by 
officials of the distribution of power and a reasonably direct translation of such 
apprehensions into national policy.”75 Arguably, however, real-world foreign 
policy formation involves a far more complex and messy process, consisting 
of more than just the specific political actors directly involved, but also all 
manner of institutional pressures and systemic constraints, which determine 
the parameters within which the relevant actors formulate policy. 
 Michael Mann describes a theory of the state he labels foul-
up theory. Through this concept, Mann tries to express the degree to which the 
state is; “chaotic, irrational, with multiple departmental authorities, presumed 
erratically and intermittently by capitalists but also by interest groups.”76 
Consequently, states can never hope to be consistent rational actors, pursuing 
strictly material interests oriented towards increased security or economic 
gains. While sometimes behaving rationally, states are also inescapably 
comprised of a plurality of fallible decision makers, formulating policies with 
imperfect information and because of various non-rational motives including 
an array of value-oriented beliefs, desires, and traditions.  
  This alternative pluralistic-fallible state model might better be 
conceptualized as simultaneously a nation and a state, thereby representing 
both the ideational and material elements which constitute complex political 
entities. Within this framework, the idea of “the state” can be used to focus 
on the material aspects of international relations —military weapons, 
economic resources, and embodied individuals in both their pluralistic 
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and fallible forms. This material view of the state is, however, significantly 
different from the unitary and rational state model adhered to within the IR 
mainstream. Alternatively, the idea of “the nation” can be used to focus on 
the ideational decision-making side of IR. This national aspect of the model 
would be comprised of the various shared-ideas traditions, norms, beliefs, 
desires, etc. —held by elements of the elites and populace —which motivate 
specific state policies and practices. From this perspective, “the state” could be 
metaphorically viewed as the physical body, while “the nation” would play the 
role of the conscious mind. Ultimately this would form a theoretical political 
entity that is simultaneously both material-state and ideational-nation. While 
the mainstream image of the state as rational unitary-actor will likely remain 
indispensable for the purposes of analytically isolating systemic forces, for 
other purposes this image can be augmented with a more complex nation-
state model— ocomprised of alternative factors such as individual agency, 
shared-ideas, and domestic politics —in order to conceptualize the state as a 
pluralistic and fallible actor within the international order.
Conclusion
While mainstream theoretical frameworks have proven effective as tools to 
analyze the top-down systemic forces which push and pull states in various 
directions, they have been less successful in understanding the impact of 
bottom-up unit level forces. It was argued above that mainstream neo-utilitarian 
theories which view the systemic material-side of international relations as 
causally fundamental risk downplaying alternative causal forces —especially 
individual agency, ideas, and domestic politics. As a solution to the material/
ideational divide, it was suggested that a Weberian-inspired methodology, 
taking account of the role of embodied individuals as the source of both agency 
and practice, might provide a means towards a pragmatic analytical synthesis. 
In other words, the supposed incommensurability of positivist and post-
positivist perspectives cannot be asserted without exploring the links between 
the shared ideas and coordinated practices of the collectivities of individuals 
which comprise social reality. In the last section it was argued that Weber’s 
methodological individualism allows individuals to span the levels of analysis, 
simultaneously having a variety of identities and belonging to a number of 
communities including those which impact upon intra-state, state level, and 
international level institutions. In this direction, it was proposed that IR needs 
an image of the state more complex than the alternatives, which include: the 
rational unitary-actor abstraction of neorealism, the personified superorganism 
of Wendt’s constructivism, the reified emergent institutional ensemble of 
scientific realism, and the ephemeral and relativistic state as discourse found 
in the linguistic theories. Finally, it was argued that mainstream neo-utilitarian 
theories, which view the systemic material-side of international relations as 
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causally fundamental, risk downplaying alternative causal forces, especially 
individual agency, ideas, and domestic politics. As a solution to these theoretical 
drawbacks, an alternative to the mainstream rational unitary-actor model of 
the state was proposed. This alternative was described as a fallible-pluralistic 
model, taking account of both the fallibility of individuals and analysts, as 
well as the manner is which states are pluralistic rather than unitary actors in 
international affairs.
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